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How will the Economic Policies of South Korea’s New 
Administration Influence Economic Relations with Japan?
Summary
1. The presidential election held in South Korea in December 2012 was essentially 
a two-horse race between Park Geun-hye of the incumbent conservative Saenuri 
Party and Moon Jae-in from the progressive Democratic United Party, which was in 
opposition. A feature of the election that attracted intense interest was the fact that 
both candidates called for economic democratization and the enhancement of the 
welfare system because of their concern about the failure of the traditional pattern 
of growth led by the chaebol groups to contribute sufficiently to the improvement of 
living standards in South Korea.
2. Characteristics of the South Korean growth model that evolved during the first 
decade of the 21st century include global business expansion led by the chaebol 
groups, active government support for big business, and export-led growth. How-
ever, while exports have been a growth driver, there have also been issues, such as 
employment problems and job insecurity for young people, and widening income 
disparity. In addition, deregulatory measures carried out by the Lee Myung-bak ad-
ministration have had the effect of concentrating economic power in the hands of the 
chaebol, while small and medium enterprises have come under pressure from the ex-
panding business activities of the chaebol.
3. Mr. Moon stated that he wanted to resurrect the equity investment ceiling system, 
which was abolished by the Lee Myung-bak administration, and announced a policy 
calling for the dissolution of cyclical investments within three years. In contrast, Ms. 
Park limited her policy stance to the prohibition of new cyclical investments and an-
nounced her intention to achieve economic democratization by taking steps to pro-
tect shopping precincts and small businesses and ensure that major corporations deal 
fairly with small and medium businesses. 
4. One of the reasons for the election victory that resulted in Ms. Park becoming 
the next president of South Korea was the fact that her policies were seen as more 
realistic. Given the South Korean public’s expectations toward economic democra-
tization, the Park administration will need to make rapid progress towards this goal 
while maintaining a balanced approach that also includes stimulatory measures and 
policies to address the declining birth rate and demographic aging.
5. The new administration needs to pursue economic democratization, but the de-
velopment of and support for small and medium enterprises will also be a priority. 
If the next stratum of businesses below major corporations can be expanded, the 
benefits are likely to include (1) an easing of the job-seeking environment for young 
people, (2) an influx of skilled people into small and medium-sized businesses, lead-
ing to improvements in their technical capabilities, (3) the prevention of the concen-
tration of economic power into the hands of the chaebol, and (4) a move away from 
excessive dependence on the chaebol for growth.
6. Statements by President Myung Lee-bak have led to deterioration in the rela-
tionship between Japan and South Korea. The inauguration of new administrations 
in both countries is expected to provide an opportunity to move towards the normal-
ization of relations. The past few years have also brought new developments on the 
economic front, and it is possible that the relationship will become even closer. If the 
governments of Japan and South Korea can rediscover their countries’ importance to 
each other as mutual economic partners, the economic relationship can be expected 
to move to the next level.
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Senior Economist
Economics Department
Japan Research Institute
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Introduction 
South Korea’s presidential election on Decem-
ber 19, 2012 attracted interest for two reasons. 
First, the election became essentially a two-person 
race between Park Geun-hye of the conservative 
ruling Saenuri Party and Moon Jae-in of the pro-
gressive opposition Democratic United Party. Sec-
ond, both candidates called for “economic democ-
ratization” and the improvement of welfare, albeit 
through different policies, on the grounds that the 
traditional pattern of growth led by the Chaebol 
conglomerates had not contributed sufficiently to 
the improvement of living standards for the South 
Korean people. The intense interest in the election 
was reflected in a high voter turnout of 75.8%. 
Ms. Park was elected and will be inaugurated 
on February 25, 2013 as South Korea’s next presi-
dent. Her victory can be attributed to three factors. 
First, she was able to consolidate the conservative 
vote by aligning two leading politicians, Lee Hoi-
chang and Lee In-Jae with the Saenuri (New Fron-
tier) Party. Second, while distancing herself from 
President Lee, she worked to change the image of 
the ruling party, which changed its name from the 
Hannara-dang (Grand National Party) in February 
2012. Third, her stance toward the reform of the 
conglomerates and her policy toward North Korea 
were more realistic than those of Mr. Moon. 
Public expectations toward the new president 
are high, but South Korea also faces many eco-
nomic issues. Policy management is likely to be 
a difficult process for the next administration. On 
the economic front, the government will need to 
take a balanced approach to stimulatory measures, 
economic democratization, and policies relating to 
a falling birthrate and demographic aging. 
Currently, a transitional committee chaired by 
Kim Yong-joon is gathering operational reports 
from government ministries and agencies and 
making preparations for the establishment of poli-
cy guidelines for the new administration. 
In this article we will examine the economic 
policies that the Park administration is likely to 
implement and examine the outlook for econom-
ic relations between Japan and South Korea. In 
Part 1 we will examine South Korea’s economic 
growth record in terms of both achievements and 
problems. In Part 2 we will analyze the factors 
that have made economic democratization such a 
contentious issue. In Part 3 we will consider the 
economic policies that the Park administration is 
likely to follow. In Part 4 we will look at the out-
look for economic relations between Japan and 
South Korea. 
1.  Pressure for Change in the 
South Korean Growth Model 
(1)  The South Korean Growth Model
The author has previously analyzed South Ko-
rea’s achievements and problems in relation to 
economic globalization(1). Discussion of this as-
pect here will therefore be limited to the scope re-
quired for the following analysis. 
Features of the economic growth pattern that 
has evolved in South Korea in the 21st century, 
which we will refer to as the “South Korean 
growth model,” include (1) global business expan-
sion by the chaebol business groups, (2) active 
government support for the chaebol, and (3) ex-
port-led growth. Factors linked to the accelerated 
globalization efforts of the chaebol groups include 
a sharp decline in domestic demand after the cur-
rency crisis, the prospect of shrinking domestic 
markets because of a plummeting birthrate and 
rapid demographic aging, and the creation of busi-
ness opportunities through the sustained growth 
of the emerging economies. Government support 
for the globalization efforts of the chaebol groups 
has included cuts in the corporate tax rate and the 
maintenance of low power prices. The government 
has also worked actively to sign free trade agree-
ments (FTAs). After the Lee Myung-bak adminis-
tration took office in 2008, it cut the corporate tax 
rate from 25% to 22%, which is one of the lowest 
rates in any major country (Fig. 1). 
South Korea has started to function as an FTA 
hub, as indicated by the fact that an FTA with the 
European Union (EU) became provisionally effec-
tive on July 1, 2011, and an FTA with the United 
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emerging markets, the presence of Japanese com-
panies has waned. Samsung Electronics and LG 
Electronics are now the leading sellers of flat-
screen televisions, while the Hyundai Group is 
ranked fifth in terms of vehicles sold. 
South Korean companies have benefited from 
stronger corporate fundamentals as a result of the 
restructuring that followed the currency crisis. 
States took effect on March 15, 2012 (Table 1). 
In recent years, Japan has taken a keen interest 
in the South Korean growth model, and there have 
been calls from various sectors for Japan to catch 
up with South Korea’s lead in globalization and 
develop demand in new markets. This reflects the 
fact that while South Korean products have gained 
an increasing share of global markets, especially 
Fig. 1  Effective Corporate Tax Rates
Source: Ministry of Finance 
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effective July 1
Peru Effective Aug. 1
U.S.A. Effective March 15
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Canada Started in July 
Mexico Started in Feb. 
Japan Started in Dec. Suspended 
since Nov.  
GCC Started in July
Australia Started in May 
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China Started in May 
Vietnam Started in Aug.
Table 1  South Korea’s Moves to Establish FTAs
Source: Nippon no Keizai Renkei Kyotei (EPA) Kosho [Japan’s EPA Negotiations], Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (October 2009), 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ROK, etc. 
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Other positive factors include quality and design 
improvements, the development of products to 
meet local needs, the development of global hu-
man resources, rapid decision-making, and the 
low value of the won. 
The effects of accelerating economic globaliza-
tion include not only the emergence of exports as 
the main driver of growth (Fig. 2), but also eco-
nomic development in regions with clusters of 
export industries, increased investment returns 
due to foreign direct investment, and the evolu-
tion of Pusan and Inchon International Airport as 
international hubs. The region with the highest per 
capita income is Ulsan Metropolitan Area, which 
has clusters of motor vehicle plants and shipyards, 
followed by Seoul Special City. 
(2)  Problems Since the 2000s 
While economic globalization has produced 
benefits, the following problems also came to the 
fore in the first decade of the 21st century. 
First, there is the fragility of an export-led 
growth pattern. As South Korea became more 
and more reliant on exports to drive its economic 
growth, it has also become extremely vulnerable 
to global economic slowdowns. South Korea is 
particularly exposed to economic trends in China, 
which accounts for around 25% of its total ex-
ports. Export slowdowns, a downturn in capital 
investment and other factors caused the real GDP 
growth rate to fall from 0.9% in the January-
March quarter of 2012 to 0.3% in the April-June 
quarter and 0.1% in the July-September quarter 
(quarter on quarter in all cases). 
However, the export slowdown was in one 
sense an anticipated outcome of global economic 
deceleration. Like other countries with export-
led economies, South Korea is fated to experience 
these trends. 
Second, progress toward the improvement of 
the employment and income environment has 
been slow. The growth rate of gross domestic in-
come (GDI) has generally remained below the 
real GDP growth rate since the turn of the century, 
and in 2011 it increased by only 1.1% because of 
accelerating inflation and decelerating economic 
performance. 
One of the reasons for slower income growth 
is a decline in the quality of jobs. The number 
of people in non-regular employment has risen 
over the past 10 years, while a growing number 
of people have moved from regular employment 
into self-employment. Major corporations have 
switched to ability-based systems since the cur-
rency crisis, with the result that it is not uncom-
mon for workers to retire in their forties (including 
those who effectively dismissed under the “honor-
ary severance” system). These early retirees fre-
quently turn to self-employment as a way of earn-
ing a living.
South Korea has one of the highest percentages 
of self-employed workers of any member of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD) (Fig. 3). The cost of starting a 
new business is minimal, and the number of start-
ups is therefore high. However, many of these 
businesses shut down within a few years because 
of fierce competition within business segments, 
the proliferation of mass-sales outlets over the 
past few years, and other factors. Because there 
is no unemployment insurance, these business 
failures can result in poverty, as will be discussed 
later in this article. 
A key employment-related problem is the seri-
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ous job-seeking difficulties faced by young peo-
ple. Only a small percentage, even among gradu-
ates of top universities, is able to find regular 
employment with major corporations. This is be-
cause major corporations limit the number of new 
graduates hired, preferring instead to recruit mid-
career employees who can be put to work imme-
diately. For this reason, an increasing number of 
people are abandoning the search for jobs and are 
instead attending schools to prepare themselves 
for the job market or public service examinations. 
There is also a growing population of people who 
have no occupations(2). As of September 2012, 
38.4% of people in the 20-29 age group were not 
participating in economic activities. 
Third, household balance sheets are deteriorat-
ing. While incomes stagnate, households have 
been burdened with rising costs in such areas as 
social insurance charges, debt repayment and edu-
cation. Household debt has become an especially 
serious issue in recent years (Fig. 4). The main 
reason for the increase in household debt was the 
housing boom, which drove an upward trend in 
housing loans. Apart from housing loans, house-
hold debt has also expanded because of increases 
in educational debt, borrowing to cover the liv-
ing expenses of low- and medium-income house-
holds, and borrowing of business capital by self-
employed people. Competition for places in better 
universities and high-quality jobs has intensified. 
In addition, English skills have become extremely 
important as major corporations move toward 
globalization. For these reasons, more and more 
households are spending large amounts of money 
on courses in English schools or early overseas 
education for their children. South Korea’s ratio 
of private educational expenditure to total house-
hold expenditure is the highest in the OECD. Edu-
cation costs are a heavy burden for all but a small 
minority of wealthy households. These problems 
were reflected in promises made by Ms. Park dur-
ing the presidential election campaign, including 
the establishment of a “National Happiness Fund” 
to ease household debt problems, and the halving 
of university fees. 
Fourth, both disparity and poverty have expand-
ed. On average, regular employees in major cor-
porations earn 3.4 times more than those in non-
regular employment in SMEs (Fig. 5). The deter-
mination of university graduates to find work with 
major corporations is understandable. 
The view that the expansion of disparity oc-
curred under the Lee Myung-bak administra-
tion is not entirely correct. The Gini Index for 
urban working households (based on disposable 
incomes, excluding single-person households) 
climbed from 0.266 in 2000 to 0.295 in 2009 but 
then showed moderate falls in two successive 
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years. (As disparity increases, the index moves 
closer to 1.0.) A similar trend has occurred in the 
income ratio between the top 20% and bottom 
20% of household. The reduction of disparity ap-
pears to have resulted from the share price slump 
and measures to help low-income households af-
ter the Lehman shocks (Fig. 6). 
What is significant here is that disparity ex-
panded in step with the accelerating trend toward 
economic globalization during the first decade of 
the 21st century. While this trend has occurred 
globally, in South Korea it has also been driven 
by such factors as the financial performance gap 
between the chaebol groups and SMEs, and the 
growth of non-regular employment. The chaebol 
groups have dramatically increased their sales in 
global markets, while most SMEs must sell their 
products in domestic markets and have faced 
chronic income stagnation. SMEs have also been 
prevented from sharing in the benefits of the chae-
bol groups’ growth by their development of global 
procurement networks, and by their tendency to 
give preference to their group companies in their 
domestic dealings. 
Even more serious than the expansion of dispar-
ity is the growth of poverty. The relative poverty 
ratio, which indicates the percentage of the total 
population earning less than 50% of the income 
distribution median (disposable income basis) 
rose from 9.2% in 2000 to 12.4% in 2011 (Fig. 
7). Measures to assist low-income people after 
the Lehman shock caused the ratio to fall for two 
consecutive years from the 2009 level of 13.1%, 
but on a market price basis (before redistribution), 
the ratio rose between 2010 and 2011. Reasons 
for this increase in poverty appear to include the 
growth of non-regular employment, the impover-
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Regular employment
(major corporations)
Non-regular employment
(SMEs)
?Millions of won?
Fig. 5   Average Yearly Incomes in 2011 
(Manufacturing Sector)
Source: Ministry of Labor of South Korea 
Fig. 6   Income Disparity (Urban 
working households, excluding 
single-person households) 
Notes 1: Gini coefficient based on disposable incomes
Notes 2: Income ratios based on top 20% and bottom 20%
Source: Statistics Korea, Household Income & Expenditure 
Trends
4.0 
4.2 
4.4 
4.6 
4.8 
5.0 
0.26
0.27
0.28
0.29
0.30
0.31
Ratio to income (right axis)
?Calendar years?
Gini coefficient (disposable income basis)
2000 01 02 03 04 0605 07 08 09 10 11
6
8
10
12
14
16
2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11
Based on disposable incomes Based on market prices
???
?Calendar years?
Fig. 7   Relative Poverty Ratio (Urban 
working households, excluding 
single-person households)
Source: Statistics Korea, Korea Statistical Information Ser-
vice
8 RIM   Pacific Business and Industries Vol. XIII, 2013 No. 47
ishment of self-employed people, and slow prog-
ress toward the development of welfare and pen-
sion systems. Poverty among the aged is an espe-
cially serious problem, as will be examined later 
in this article. 
For these reasons, South Korea will need to find 
a new growth model to replace the old South Ko-
rean growth model. 
2.  Factors that Make Economic 
Democratization Essential
In this section we will look at developments 
relating to economic democratization, which be-
came a focus of debate during the presidential 
election. 
(1)  Shift away from Policies Favoring Big 
Business under Lee Administration 
After taking office in February 2008, the ad-
ministration of President Lee Myung-bak initially 
stated that it would revitalize the economy by 
cutting taxes and easing regulations. The corpo-
rate tax rate for large corporations was reduced 
from 25% to 22% in 2008, with a further 2% cut 
planned for 2012. In 2009, the government also 
abolished the equity investment ceiling system, 
which was seen as a hindrance to the expansion of 
investment (Table 2). The equity investment ceil-
ing system prohibited affiliated to chaebol groups 
with assets above a certain level from holding 
shares in other companies beyond a certain per-
centage of their net assets. During the recent pres-
idential election, Mr. Moon promised to reinstate 
this system. 
Even taking into account the economic slow-
down that followed the Lehman shock, deregula-
tion brought little benefit in terms of investment 
expansion. In fact, the easing of restrictions had a 
number of effects that caused public perceptions 
of the chaebol groups to become even more nega-
tive, including the increased concentration of eco-
nomic power in the hands of the chaebol groups, 
the crowding out of SMEs due to business expan-
sion by the chaebol groups, and the discovery of 
various unlawful activities involving the chaebol. 
Another factor that prompted the Lee adminis-
tration to move away from policies favoring big 
business was the defeat of ruling party candidates 
in elections. In November 2011, the Distribution 
Industry Development Act was amended to pro-
hibit the opening of major retail outlets within 500 
meters of existing markets. At the end of 2011, 
the government established the Commission on 
Shared Growth and began to create structures to 
ensure that profits would be shared between major 
corporations and SMEs. In the fall of 2011, the 
additional tax cut scheduled for 2012 was can-
celed. 
In 2012, President Lee Myung-bak called on 
the chaebol groups to make a number of changes, 
including withdrawal from activities tradition-
ally handled by SMEs(3), and the creation of jobs 
through the reduction of work on days off (not 
covered by restrictions on working hours). The 
groups adopted stances that were in line with 
these government policies. For example, the Sam-
sung Group promised to withdraw from the Ho-
tel Silla, while the Hyundai Motor Group and the 
Lotte Group announced that they would pull out 
of the bakery business(4). Several groups, includ-
ing Lotte, Hyundai Heavy Industries, GS (a 2005 
spin-off from the LG Group), Hanjin and Hanwha, 
also amended their practice of channeling orders 
into affiliated companies and increased their use 
of competitive bidding in the areas of advertising, 
systems integration, construction and logistics. 
In the retail sector, the government expanded 
measures designed to limit the operations of ma-
jor corporations (Table 3). The law was amended 
December 1986 40% of net assets 
December 1994 Reduced to 25%
February 1998 Abolished
December 1999 Reintroduced at 25%
March 2002 Applicability level: 5 trillion won
March 2005 Applicability level: 6 trillion won
April 2007 Applicability level: 10 trillion won, ceiling 
raised to 40%
March 2009 Abolished 
Table 2   Changes in Equity Investment 
Ceiling System
Source: Korea Fair Trade Commission, Annual Report 
2011
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to allow local authorities to impose restrictions on 
the operations of major discount stores (known 
as “marts”) and corporate super-supermarkets 
(SSMs). This resulted in the introduction of ordi-
nances compelling certain types of retailers, such 
as large discount stores, to close on the second 
and fourth Sundays of each month in some loca-
tions, including administrative areas in Seoul. The 
first mart in South Korea, E-Mart, was opened by 
the Shinsegae Group, which was established in 
1991 as a Samsung Group spin-off. Other major 
marts include the Lotte Group’s Lotte Mart and 
the Samsung Group’s Home Plus. 
In addition, the Korea Fair Trade Commission 
introduced a series of measures prohibiting fran-
chise chains, such as bakeries, coffee shops and 
pizza restaurants (excluding companies that own 
and operate their own outlets), from opening out-
lets within specified distances of existing outlets. 
These measures are designed to protect the liveli-
hoods of the many retirees who have established 
franchise businesses. After much debate, the gov-
ernment decided in December 2012 to amend the 
Distribution Industry Development Act to require 
large discount stores and SSMs to close between 
midnight and 8 a.m., and to close on two Sundays 
each month(5). 
With the exception of people working for chae-
bol groups, the people of South Korea have re-
ceived little direct benefit from the global expan-
sion of the groups. In fact, the chaebol groups 
have become a threat to the very existence of 
SMEs by expanding their business activities and 
taking advantage of their dominant positions to 
force down prices. Another factor that is fanning 
anti-chaebol sentiment is the fact that some of the 
groups have been able to increase their sales by 
expanding exports at a time when business condi-
tions are harsh because of the worsening domestic 
economic situation. 
It was in this environment that the achievement 
of coexistence between the chaebol groups and 
SMEs became a major point of debate during the 
presidential election. 
(2)  Differences in the Economic Democratiza-
tion Policies of Ms. Park and Mr. Moon
The concept of economic democratization may 
seem to have emerged suddenly, but in fact it is 
stipulated in the constitution(6), which says in Ar-
ticle 119 Paragraph (2) that “the State may regu-
late and coordinate economic affairs in order to 
maintain the balanced growth and stability of the 
national economy, to ensure proper distribution of 
income, to prevent the domination of the market 
and the abuse of economic power, and to democ-
ratize the economy through harmony among the 
economic agents.” 
Not only Mr. Moon of the Democratic United 
Party, but also Ms. Park promised to implement 
measures relating to economic democratization, 
including the protection of local shopping pre-
cincts and micro-enterprises, improved fairness 
in trading between major corporations and SMEs, 
the rigorous enforcement of the Monopoly Regu-
lation and Fair Trade Act, and greater indepen-
dence for the Korean Fair Trade Commission. 
Where the policies of Mr. Moon and Ms. Park 
differ widely is in the way that they want to move 
South Korea away from a structure dominated by 
the chaebol groups (Table 4). 
Mr. Moon promised that he would reinstate 
the equity investment ceiling system and dissolve 
March 
Compulsory closure of discount stores in 
certain regions on second and fourth Sundays 
of each month
April 
Prohibition on establishment of new outlets 
within 500 meters of existing outlets by bakery 
franchise chains 
July 
Prohibition on establishment of new outlets 
within 800 meters and 1,500 meters 
respectively of existing outlets by fried chicken 
and pizza franchise chains 
November 
Korea Fair Trade Commission order prohibiting 
establishment of new outlets within 500 
meters of existing outlets by coffee franchise 
chains (Caffe Bene, Hollys Coffee, Angel-in-
us Coffee, Tom N Toms, a Twosome Place) 
Announcement on November 25 that Costco, 
which had previously ignored the regulation 
introduced in March, would close its Daegu 
and Seoul stores on the second and fourth 
Sundays of each month
December 
Amendment to the Distribution Industry 
Development Act passed by the National 
Assembly, requiring discount stores and 
SSMs to be closed between midnight and 
8am and on two days each month
Table 3   Retail Sector Regulations 
Introduced in 2012
Source: Compiled from media reports 
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cular shareholdings. In the case of the Samsung 
Group, for example, Samsung Everland, in which 
founding family members are the dominant share-
holders, holds shares in Samsung Life, which is 
a shareholder in Samsung Electronics. Samsung 
Electronics is itself a shareholder in Samsung 
Card, and Samsung Card holds shares in Samsung 
Everland (Fig. 8). In 2005, Samsung Electronics 
Chairman Lee Kun-hee was charged with tax eva-
sion and forced to resign the chairmanship tem-
porarily after it was discovered that he had sold 
Everland convertible bonds to his son, Jay Y. Lee, 
at a discounted price. Mr. Moon wants to reform 
the chaebol-dominated economic structure by tak-
ing a scalpel to shareholding structures. However, 
it is questionable whether this approach would be 
practical. If the government unilaterally tightens 
restrictions on the chaebol groups, the relationship 
between the government and the business sector 
could deteriorate, and there could be a decline in 
domestic investment. A further downturn in in-
vestment would weaken the economy’s capacity 
circular shareholdings within three years. The eq-
uity investment ceiling system was introduced to 
prevent unbridled business expansion by major 
corporations. As noted above, however, the Lee 
administration abolished the system in 2009 on 
the grounds that it was curbing free economic ac-
tivity and hindering the expansion of investment. 
Circular shareholdings allow the founding fami-
lies of the chaebol groups to control their groups 
with minimal capital through linked equity invest-
ment across group companies. This situation is 
problematic for a number of reasons. From a cor-
porate governance viewpoint, there are inadequate 
checks and balances to prevent autocratic manage-
ment by owners. In addition, deterioration in the 
financial performance of one company can impact 
on the financial positions of other companies. 
After the currency crisis, several chaebol 
groups, including LG and SK, dissolved their cir-
cular shareholdings and established holding com-
panies(7). Others, however, including Samsung, 
Hyundai Motor and Hanjin, have maintained cir-
Mr. Moon Ms. Park
?Restrictions on Chaebol
Equity investment ceiling
Circular shareholding
Governance
Reintroduction
Dissolution within 3 years
Scalpel to be taken to control 
structures 
None
Ban on new circular shareholding
Ban on monopolies, rigorous 
enforcement of the Monopoly Regulation 
and Fair Trade Act
?Other economic 
democratization measures 
?Protection of SMEs and micro-
enterprises
?Halving of non-regular employment 
?Reduction of working hours (also 
linked to job creation)
?Improvement of welfare
?Protection of SMEs and micro-
enterprises
?Coexistence between large 
corporation and SMEs, pressure on 
large corporation to trade fairly
?Conversion of public sector non-
regular jobs into regular jobs
?Improvement of welfare
?Job creation 
?Promotion of entrepreneurial spirit
?Support for 4,000 SMEs
?Convergence of IT and 
manufacturing technology 
?Creation of 400,000 public service 
jobs over 5 years 
?Development of knowledge creation 
industries based on science and 
technology 
?Strengthening of service industries 
?Support for renewable/clean energy 
?Tax incentives for companies that 
contribute to job creation
?Policies toward North Korea
?Summit talks in 2013
?Forward-looking stance on economic 
cooperation 
?Resumption of dialog, development of 
relationship based on trust
?Policies toward Japan 
?Future-oriented
?No compromise on territorial and 
textbook issues
?Pursuit of Japanese government’s 
responsibility concerning “comfort 
women” problem
?Japan an important friend
?Establishment of EPA to take 
relationship to a higher level
?No room for negotiation on Dokdo 
Island, call for Japanese government 
to rethink its stance on the “comfort 
women” problem
Table 4  Basic Policies of Ms. Park and Mr. Moon 
Source: Materials published by the Saenuri Party and the progressive Democratic United Party
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to create jobs, leading to increased public dissatis-
faction. However, if priority is given to economic 
recovery, resulting in a return to deregulation, the 
chaebol reform process would be delayed, and it 
would be necessary to start again from scratch. 
In April Ms. Park indicated that she would sup-
port the reinstatement of the equity investment 
ceiling, but she later recanted. Her policy on cir-
cular shareholdings is to ban the creation of new 
links. Her reasons for toning down her position on 
chaebol reform appear to have included not only 
concern in the business sector that the economic 
democratization argument may have gone too far, 
but also difficulty of implementing reforms with-
out the cooperation of the companies, and the fact 
that while most people saw the need for reform, 
they also desperately wanted improvement in the 
employment environment. At first glance, Ms. 
Park’s stance may seem to be friendly toward the 
chaebol, but in fact she is demanding that the con-
glomerates stop abusing their power and fulfill 
their social responsibilities. At the same time, she 
has also pledged to sever the hand-in-glove rela-
tionship between political power and the chaebol 
by eradicating corruption among the president’s 
close associates and family members, and reform-
ing government agencies, including the Prosecu-
tion Service, the National Police Agency, the Na-
tional Tax Service and the Financial Supervisory 
Service. 
The public’s verdict on economic democrati-
zation is not clear, but it appears that Ms. Park’s 
policies were seen as more realistic. The question 
now is how she will approach economic democra-
tization. 
3.  Challenges for the New Ad-
ministration, Future Economic 
Policies
In this section we will consider the challenges 
facing the new administration and its policy di-
rection. The new administration is under pressure 
to move toward economic democratization, but it 
will need to take a balanced approach. 
(1)  Approaches to Economic Democratization 
Immediately after winning the election, Ms. 
Park issued a message to the people of South Ko-
rea, stating that she would prevent people from 
falling through the cracks in society by ensuring 
that the benefits of economic growth would be 
shared. In view of public expectations toward eco-
nomic democratization, the Park administration 
will need to take prompt action. 
However, chaebol reform will not be a simple 
task because of the sheer size of the conglomer-
ates. In 2011, the sales of the Samsung group were 
equivalent to 22% of South Korea’s nominal GDP, 
while the combined sales of Samsung, Hyundai 
Motors, SK and LG contributed about 50%. The 
following factors are likely to play a key role in 
progress toward economic democratization.
First, cooperation with the business sector will 
be essential. Economic democratization does 
not mean “chaebol bashing.” Ms. Park’s stance 
is to acknowledge the role played by the chae-
bol groups in economic development, while also 
insisting that they meet their social responsibili-
ties. The key question for the chaebol is whether 
they can establish management approaches based 
on partnership with the people of South Korea. If 
they fail to do this, public criticism of the chaebol 
could again intensify. 
As soon as her administration takes office, the 
President is expected to announce measures to 
stamp out corruption among those wielding po-
litical power. She is also expected to announce a 
Fig. 8   Circular Shareholdings 
 (A Case Study of Samsung)
Source: Nippon Keizai Shinbun, December 6, 2012
Lee Boo-jin, 
president 
of Hotel Silla 
(daughter)
Jay Y. Lee, 
Vice Chairman, 
Samsung Electronics 
(son)
Lee Kun-hee, 
Chairman, 
Samsung Electronics
Lee Seo-hyun, 
Vice President, 
Cheil Industries 
(daughter)
Samsung 
Everland
Samsung 
Life
Samsung 
Electronics
Samsung 
Card
Shareholdings in 
manufacturing 
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19.3?
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3.7?
7.5?
3.4?
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undue optimism. 
A key issue will be how to deal with a burgeon-
ing debt burden. One of Ms. Park’s election prom-
ises was to establish “National Happiness Fund” 
to ease the burden of high interest rates and help 
delinquent debtors to restore their credit ratings. 
Other promises included the alleviation of the stu-
dent loan burden. Specifically, the National Hap-
piness Fund will buy overdue debts from financial 
institutions and allow applicants to restructure 
their debt through repayment over longer periods. 
Up to a limit of 10 million won per person, bor-
rowers will be able to convert loans with interest 
rates over 20% to low-interest bank loans with 
rates of around 10%. This emphasis on measures 
targeting low- and medium-income people can be 
seen as contributing to economic democratization 
in a broader sense. 
Third, economic democratization measures will 
need to be paralleled by SME development mea-
sures. In addition to a shift away from a chaebol-
dominated economic structure through economic 
democratization, another priority will be the de-
velopment of and support for businesses at the 
next level below major corporations. President 
Park’s priorities are apparent from the fact that af-
ter her election she visited the Korea Federation 
of Small and Medium Business before the Federa-
tion of Korean Industries, which is organization 
for owners of major corporations, and also from 
the fact that she appointed Mr. Lee Hyun-jae, who 
was administrator of the Small & Medium Busi-
ness Administration under the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration, to the transitional committee as 
member of the second subcommittee for econom-
ic affairs. We will look next at the significance of 
SME development, including its relevance to the 
problems of a falling birthrate and demographic 
aging. 
(2)  Urgent Steps Needed to Cope with an 
Aged Society 
From a longer-term perspective, too, South Ko-
rea has reached a social and economic turning 
point. The rapid trends toward birthrate decline 
and demographic aging have created a need for 
number of steps relating to coexistence between 
the chaebol groups and SMEs, including a ban 
on chaebol participation in business areas that 
are suitable for SMEs, a shift to trading based on 
fair prices, and the placement of orders with non-
group companies. The chaebol are also likely to 
be called upon to accept a share of social costs by 
increasing their regular employment levels and 
paying more toward social insurance costs. In ad-
dition, President Park is expected to seek the sup-
port of the chaebol groups for economic democ-
ratization policies, such as the sharing of profits 
with society. It is also possible that presidential 
decrees will be given legal force. 
Second, President Park will need to maintain 
balance among policies with differing timeframes. 
South Korea currently faces short-term, medium-
term and long-term economic challenges relating 
to stimulatory measures, economic democratiza-
tion and measures to cope with a falling birthrate 
and demographic aging, and it cannot afford to 
give priority to economic democratization mea-
sures. 
For example, if President Park were to imple-
ment all of the measures promised during the 
election, such as free childcare, the halving of 
university fees, a shift from non-regular to regular 
employment and the improvement of welfare, she 
would sacrifice fiscal soundness and put obstacles 
in the way of initiatives focusing on an aged soci-
ety, as discussed later in this article. In addition, 
popular anger could erupt if the employment envi-
ronment worsens because of government neglect 
of measures to stimulate the economy. 
For these reasons, the Park administration will 
need to take the economic situation into account 
when implementing economic democratization 
measures. Stimulatory measures employed in the 
past include monetary easing, the partial relax-
ation of restrictions on real estate lending and tax 
cuts (mainly reductions in real estate acquisition 
taxes and special consumption tax rates for mo-
tor vehicles and major appliances). Household 
balance sheets will improve if lower interest rates 
reduce the interest burden, and if the resulting re-
vitalization of the real estate market causes hous-
ing prices to rise. However, there is no room for 
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measures to achieve growth while preparing for 
an aged society(8). 
South Korea’s total fertility rate fell from 1.71 
in 1991 to 1.47 in 2000. In 2001 it dropped to 1.30, 
which is below the Japanese level, and by 2005 it 
was 1.08 (1.23 in 2010). The reasons for this ac-
celerating decline in the birthrate since the turn 
of the century include a deteriorating income and 
employment environment, as described above, as 
well as rising educational costs and a social envi-
ronment in which it is difficult to achieve a proper 
work-life balance. 
Because of this accelerating fall in the birth-
rate, current predictions indicate that by 2017 the 
productive-age population (15-64) will start to 
shrink, and South Korea will make the transition 
to an aged society, in which 14% or more of the 
population is aged 65 or older (Fig. 9). The pro-
cess of industrialization, which took many years 
in the advanced industrialized countries, was com-
pressed in South Korea. The transition to an aged 
society is also being compressed. 
One problem that is coming to the fore as South 
Korea becomes an aged society is poverty among 
aged people (retirees)(9). South Korea’s relative 
poverty ratio for aged people is the highest of any 
OECD member (Fig. 10). Reasons for this include 
short working lives due to early retirement, low 
pension benefits, and failure to use government 
assistance schemes. 
Apart from savings, continued employment and 
assistance from children and relatives, aged peo-
ple subsist mainly on retirement benefits, national 
pensions and government benefit schemes for 
low-income people. In South Korea, support for 
aging parents was traditionally the role of the el-
dest son. However, family situations have changed 
dramatically in recent years because of factors 
that include the trend toward nuclear family living 
and the growing number of women in the work 
force. These changes have eroded the capacity of 
families to provide support for the aged(10). The 
number of aged people living alone or as married 
couples is tending to increase. Unlike Japan, the 
percentage of aged people living with their chil-
dren is lower in rural areas than in cities. 
If aged people can no longer depend on support 
from their children, they have to rely on public 
pensions. Unfortunately these systems are not ad-
equately developed in South Korea. 
South Korea has introduced special-purpose 
pension schemes, including the government em-
ployee pension scheme in 1960, a pension scheme 
for military personnel in 1963, and a pension 
scheme for teachers and staff of private schools 
in 1975. However, it was not until 1988 that the 
government introduced a national pension scheme 
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(3)  The Importance of SME Development
To alleviate poverty among the aged, it is nec-
essary to create an environment that facilitates 
employment for those willing to work, and to im-
prove pension and welfare systems. Funding be-
comes an issue when governments try to improve 
pension and welfare systems(11). South Korea’s 
consumption tax rate is already at 10%, and fur-
ther increases would be difficult to implement, 
in part because of the risk of public anger. In the 
medium-term perspective, corporate income taxes 
could be raised back to the level before they were 
reduced under the Lee Myung-bak administration. 
A major increase would be difficult, however, be-
cause of the harsh business environment. Electric-
ity charges are now being reviewed after being 
held down through government policy, and the un-
dervalued won has started to move to a more nor-
mal level. To improve social insurance, it would 
be necessary for workers and employers to accept 
a “reasonable” share of the cost. 
From this perspective, the best option would 
be to target sustainable growth while working 
to strengthen the taxation base. What is impor-
tant in this context is to facilitate employment for 
young people by creating high-quality jobs, and 
covering all citizens aged 18 and older but un-
der 60. Initially the scheme covered business es-
tablishments with 10 or more employees, but its 
scope was gradually expanded to include business 
establishments with five or more employees in 
1992, people working in farming and fishing and 
self-employed people in farming and fishing com-
munities in 1995, and self-employed people, mi-
cro-enterprise operators, casual workers and day 
laborers in urban areas in 1999. Premiums and 
benefits have been reviewed a number of times to 
reflect changes in the socioeconomic environment. 
At present the premium is 9%. The cost is split 
50-50 between employers and employees in the 
case of people working business establishments, 
while those in other categories must pay the full 
amount themselves. The benefit rate is 40%. How-
ever, people must belong to the scheme for 40 
years to receive the full benefit rate of 40%. The 
minimum membership period is 20 years, and at 
that stage the benefit rate is about one-half of the 
full rate. 
The difficult situation faced by aged people in 
South Korea becomes apparent when we compare 
their income sources with those of aged people in 
other countries. The 7th International Comparison 
Survey Concerning Livelihoods and Attitudes of 
Elderly, which was conducted by the Prime Min-
ister’s Office in 2010, covered males and females 
aged 60 and over in Japan, the United States, 
South Korea, Germany and Sweden. The results 
showed that aged people in South Korea relied 
heavily on income from work and assistance from 
children, but that their reliance on public pensions 
was low (Fig. 11). Particularly significant is the 
fact that public pensions make up just 30.3% of 
incomes in South Korea, compared with 86.8% in 
Germany, 85.9% in Japan, 81.5% in Sweden and 
77.5% in the United States. 
When survey participants were asked if they 
were experiencing difficulties with day-to-day liv-
ing, the percentage of negative responses in South 
Korea was extremely low at 11.2%, compared 
with 58.4% in Sweden, 55.5% in Japan and 38.4% 
in Germany. 
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to achieve a transition from non-regular to regu-
lar employment. In this sense, South Korea’s goal 
should be growth that generates high-quality em-
ployment. 
Global expansion by large corporations has pro-
duced an employment pattern in which companies 
recruit talented people in South Korea and over-
seas for their core areas of activity, while employ-
ing large numbers of non-regular workers for their 
production operations. Young people are forced to 
compete fiercely from a young age for jobs with 
large corporations, but only a limited number ever 
achieve that goal. The remainder must either ac-
cept low incomes as non-regular workers, or re-
main in university or work skill training schools 
in the hope of future opportunities. Because many 
people remain in some form of study situation 
rather than taking up employment, there has been 
an increase in the number of young people who 
are not participating in economic activities. This 
situation is also reflected in a falling marriage rate 
and birthrate (Fig. 12). 
However, this situation also means that South 
Korea has a large pool of unutilized human re-
sources. If this dormant resource can be mobilized 
to create new industries, South Korea would be 
able to shift to a new growth path. Failure to do so 
will result in a low-growth era. 
While South Korea has been able to develop 
large corporations, its progress toward the devel-
opment of middle-ranked companies and SMEs 
has been slower. However, the fact that progress 
has been slow also means that there is room for 
growth. A number of benefits could be achieved 
by expanding the stratum of businesses at the 
level below major corporations. For example, it 
should be possible to alleviate the employment 
problems faced by young people, improve the 
technical capabilities of SMEs through an influx 
of skilled people, prevent the concentration of 
economic power in the hand of chaebol compa-
nies, and move away from a growth pattern that is 
excessively reliant on chaebol companies. A better 
employment environment for young people would 
also lead to a higher birthrate. To raise the birth-
rate, South Korea will also need to create an envi-
ronment in which people can more readily achieve 
a good work-life balance. 
While recognizing the importance of SME de-
velopment, we also need to acknowledge the dif-
ficulty of this task. Because of the wide income 
and welfare gap between large corporations and 
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SMEs, skilled and talented people are not attract-
ed to smaller companies. This situation prevents 
SMEs from improving their technical capabilities, 
preventing them from closing the gap with major 
corporations. As a result, they are unable to attract 
skilled and talented people. Breaking out of this 
vicious circle will be a major priority. 
Because of the powerful influence of the chae-
bol groups, it will to some extent be necessary to 
restrict the participation of major corporations in 
business areas that are suitable for SMEs. How-
ever, mere protection could have the effect of 
preventing SMEs from innovating. The important 
thing is to develop SMEs with excellent technol-
ogy and product development capabilities. Ms. 
Park intends to allocate a larger share of the bud-
get for government-led research projects to SMEs. 
Policies announced by Ms. Park in relation to 
job creation include the development of knowl-
edge creation industries and new service indus-
tries, and support for green energy industries. 
These approaches are not especially novel and 
most have been implemented by the present ad-
ministration. What is needed now is the organic 
linkage of these polices to SME development. For 
example, the construction of smart cities based on 
the use of renewable energy and IT would stimu-
late growth in various industries, including new 
logistics, next-generation vehicles, education and 
health and medicine . SMEs should be encouraged 
to participate in these areas as a way of providing 
further impetus for growth. 
Support measures for SMEs are currently dis-
persed across multiple functional categories and 
industrial sectors. Ms. Park’s transitional commit-
tee plans to build a more efficient support struc-
ture by realigning these policies and reviewing 
similar or duplicated projects. 
The key question now is whether or not South 
Korea can build a new growth model capable of 
driving sustainable growth. SME development 
will clearly be one of the most important policy 
areas. 
In the final section of this article, we will look 
at South Korea’s economic relationship with Ja-
pan on the basis of the preceding analysis. 
4.  New Developments Anticipat-
ed in Economic Relationship 
with Japan
South Korea’s relationship with Japan soured 
following a series of comments and actions by 
President Lee Myung-bak. However, the inaugu-
ration of new administrations in both countries is 
expected to lead to the normalization of relations 
and new developments in the economic relation-
ship. 
(1)  Japan as a Vital Economic Partner 
Many observers have commented that South 
Korea’s economic relationship with China has 
strengthened over the past few years, while its re-
lationship with Japan has weakened. The fact that 
South Korea initiated FTA negotiations with Chi-
na ahead of Japan appears to support this view. 
South Korea’s reliance on exports to Japan fell 
from 11.9% in 2000 to 7.1% in 2011 (6.0% in 
2010, before the earthquake), and its reliance on 
imports from Japan from 19.8% to 13.0% (15.1% 
in 2010) (Table 5). While these trends are also at-
tributable to the expansion of relationships with 
emerging economies, they are indicative of a de-
cline in Japan’s importance to South Korea. 
Economic relations between Japan and South 
(%)
Exports Imports
U.S.A. Japan China U.S.A. Japan China
1991 25.8 17.2 1.4 23.2 25.9 4.2
96 16.7 12.2 8.8 22.2 20.9 5.7
2000 21.8 11.9 10.7 18.2 19.8 8.0
01 20.7 11.0 12.1 15.9 18.9 9.4
02 20.2 9.3 14.6 15.1 19.6 11.4
03 17.7 8.9 18.1 13.9 20.3 12.3
04 16.9 8.5 19.6 12.8 20.6 13.2
05 14.5 8.4 21.8 11.7 18.5 14.8
06 13.3 8.2 21.3 10.9 16.8 15.7
07 12.3 7.1 22.1 10.4 15.8 17.7
08 11.0 6.7 21.7 8.8 14.0 17.7
09 10.4 6.0 23.9 9.0 15.3 16.8
10 10.7 6.0 25.1 9.5 15.1 16.8
11 10.0 7.0 24.1 8.6 13.1 16.5
Table 5   Major Markets’ Shares of 
South Korea’s Exports and 
Imports 
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics System
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Korea are likely to have been affected by the fact 
that the South Korean government no longer sees 
the establishment of an economic partnership 
agreement with Japan as a priority, and by the fact 
that President Lee Myung-bak crossed a certain 
line with his comments and actions. However, it 
would be a mistake to conclude that Japan is no 
longer very important to the South Korean econo-
my. 
First, while South Korea’s reliance on imports 
from Japan has declined, it is still high. This is be-
cause core parts, high-quality materials and manu-
facturing equipment supplied by Japanese com-
panies are essential to the production activities of 
South Korean companies. 
Second, the downtrend in South Korea’s reli-
ance on exports to Japan bottomed out in 2010 
and was followed by a shift to upward movement 
(Fig. 13). On the other hand, reliance on imports 
from China has declined due to the growing pres-
ence of other emerging countries, and reliance on 
exports to China is also expected to fall gradually. 
The rise in reliance on exports to Japan is not a 
temporary phenomenon in the wake of the Great 
East Japan Earthquake. As discussed later in this 
article, there has been an increase in exports of 
motor vehicle parts, indicating that cross-border 
supply chains have been formed between Japan 
and South Korea. 
Third, investment from Japan is playing a key 
role in the development of an advanced industrial 
structure in South Korea. South Korea has worked 
to reduce its trade deficit with Japan by strength-
ening its manufacturers of parts and raw materi-
als, which account for a large share of imports 
from Japan. In 2001, a special law was introduced 
concerning the development of companies spe-
cializing in parts and raw materials, and in 2005 
the government designated 10 strategic parts and 
materials, including parts and materials for LCDs 
and organic EL devices. More recently industrial 
parks specializing mainly in parts and materials 
for the Japanese market have been established in a 
number of locations, including the cities of Gumi 
and Pohang in Gyeongsangbuk-do Province. 
In addition, investment in South Korea has start-
ed to offer significant benefits to Japanese com-
panies. As supply capacity expands, it is becom-
ing possible to run local production operations 
profitably. Other advantages of local production 
include the ability to gather information from and 
communicate with customers, the facilitation of 
joint development, and the avoidance of exchange 
fluctuation risks. South Korea’s attractiveness as a 
production base has been further enhanced by the 
South Korean government’s enthusiasm for the 
signing of FTAs. 
These factors are reflected in a growth trend in 
investment from Japan. Statistics compiled by the 
South Korean Ministry of Knowledge Economy 
show that investment (applications basis) in-
creased by 98.4% year on year in 2012 (Fig. 14). 
Accounting for 27.9% of total foreign investment, 
Japan is the biggest investor in South Korea. 
There has been a steady increase in investment in 
the parts and raw materials industries, which are 
priority areas for the South Korean government(12). 
In view of this growth in investment from Ja-
pan, which is essential to the development of an 
advanced industrial structure in South Korea, the 
South Korean government has doubtless reached 
the conclusion that deteriorating inter-government 
relations must not be allowed to inflict fatal dam-
age on the economic relationship. Although state-
ments and actions by President Lee Myung-bak 
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may have damaged inter-government relations, 
the impact on the economic relationship has been 
limited(13). 
Various conclusions have been drawn from the 
fact that the currency-swap agreement between 
Japan and South Korea lapsed at the end of Oc-
tober 2012. The Japanese government suggested 
that the decision not to extend the expanded swap 
agreement could be seen as a sanction, with the 
result that the decision has tended to be viewed in 
this light. A more likely reason is that there was a 
tacit agreement that since the risk of a collapse of 
the won has waned(14), the two governments could 
save face and preserve their political stances by 
treating this as an economic issue. 
South Korea has certainly not reviewed its rela-
tionship with Japan and decided to strengthen its 
ties with China. Evidence of this can be found in 
the resumption in November of meetings between 
ministers of finance, which had been suspended. 
The two ministers agreed that financial markets 
in both countries had remained stable, and that 
macroeconomic conditions were still sound, de-
spite the expiration of the temporary expanded 
currency-swap agreement on October 31, 2012, as 
scheduled. Both ministers also noted that the tem-
porary measure had limited the impact of global 
financial uncertainty on the South Korean and Jap-
anese economies, and that it had made a signifi-
cant contribution to stability in both the South Ko-
rean foreign exchange market and regional finan-
cial markets. According to the Japanese Finance 
Ministry website, the ministers further agreed that 
economic developments in their respective coun-
tries and globally should be monitored closely, 
and that Japan and South Korea should continue 
to cooperate appropriately if necessary. 
Interaction in the business community also 
plays a significant role in Japan-South Korea re-
lations. The Japan-Korea Economic Association 
and the Korea-Japan Economic Association have 
maintained face-to-face contacts through their an-
nual conferences for business leaders. These links 
have been strengthened most at times when gov-
ernment-level relations have become strained as 
a result of visits to Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese 
leaders, controversy over Japanese history text-
books, and other issues. 
Ties could become even closer if the establish-
ment of new administrations in both countries 
leads to the normalization of Japan-South Korea 
relations. Japan is likely to take steps to repair its 
relationship with South Korea for two reasons. 
First, the Abe administration places great impor-
tance on Japan’s alliance with the United States, 
and President Obama is concerned about the fal-
tering relationship between Japan and South Ko-
rea, which are both allies of the United States. 
Second, the strengthening of the relationship 
among Japan, the United States and South Korea 
is an essential part of Japan’s foreign policy to-
ward China. Evidence of Japan’s commitment to 
the improvement of relations can be found in the 
decision to send a special envoy to meet Presi-
dent-Elect Park on January 4. 
For South Korea, the improvement of relations 
with the United States and Japan is vital to its pol-
icy toward North Korea. South Korea also needs 
to cooperate with Japan in order to curb China’s 
growing influence in East Asia. It is reasonable to 
assume that South Korea wants to work alongside 
Japan, for which democracy and market econom-
ics are fundamental principles, to play a leading 
role in rule-making and economic integration in 
Asia. 
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Japan-South Korea relations are also likely to 
become closer as a result of new economic trends. 
We will next look at these trends, using the motor 
vehicle industry as a case study. 
(2)  New Trends Manifested in the Motor Ve-
hicle Industry
Trends in the motor vehicle industry point to 
the possibility of closer economic cooperation 
between Japan and South Korea. The trade in mo-
tor vehicle parts was characterized by substantial 
deficits on the South Korean side until the first 
half of the 1990s. In 2012, there was a decline in 
imports from Japan, coupled with a sharp increase 
in exports, with the result that the trade is now ba-
sically in balance (Fig. 15). 
The South Korean government’s determined ef-
forts to sign FTAs appear to have played a major 
role in the decline in imports from Japan because 
of (1) the growth of imports from Europe and the 
United States after the removal of tariffs, and (2) 
the launch of American-made models onto the 
South Korean market by Japanese assemblers. 
Evidence for this can be found in the fact that 
while Japan’s share of the total value of South Ko-
rea’s imports of motor vehicle parts had been on 
a downward trend since the 1990s, this rapid de-
cline only occurred in the past two years (Fig. 16). 
An analysis of trends in imports of motor ve-
hicle parts over the past two years shows (1) 
that China overtook Japan to become the biggest 
source in 2012, (2) that the value of motor vehicle 
imports rose by 12.7% in 2011, accompanied by 
growth in imports from the United States and the 
EU, and (3) imports from some countries with-
in the EU, notably Austria, Italy and Germany, 
showed particularly large increases. 
While there are no detailed data concerning im-
porters of parts from China, the total appears to 
include large quantities imported from South Ko-
rean companies operating in China. The increase 
in imports from Austria is explained by the estab-
lishment of several parts manufacturing plants by 
foreign companies, especially from Germany, as a 
result of the Austrian government’s efforts to de-
velop the motor vehicle industry through industry-
academia collaboration and the formation of in-
dustry clusters. 
Another reason for the fall in imports of motor 
vehicle parts from Japan is the fact that Japanese 
motor vehicle assemblers have replaced some 
of the vehicles that were previously exported to 
South Korea from Japan with vehicles exported 
from the United States. (High-end models, such 
as the Lexus and Infiniti, are still exported from 
Fig. 15   South Korea’s Trade in Motor 
Vehicle Parts with Japan
Notes: 2012 up to October
Source: Korea International Trade Association data base
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Fig. 16   South Korea’s Imports of 
Motor Vehicle Parts and 
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Notes: 2012 up to October
Source: Korea International Trade Association data base
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Japan.) This has led to a reduction in exports of 
maintenance parts from Japan. 
Since late 2011, more and more finished vehi-
cles manufactured in the United States have been 
launched onto the South Korean market. This re-
flects the fact that the tariff on finished vehicles 
imported from the United States was reduced to 
4% after the FTA between South Korea and the 
United States took effect and will be removed en-
tirely in the fifth year, as well as the erosion of 
price competitiveness by an extremely high yen. 
Toyota began to export the American-made Si-
enna Minivans to South Korea in November 2011. 
In 2012 it introduced a new-model Camry, earlier 
models of which were exported from Japan, fol-
lowed by the Venza (a sedan-SUV crossover) in 
November of that year. Honda exports four mod-
els, including a new-model Accord, from the Unit-
ed States, and a European-specified Civic from 
the United Kingdom. Nissan also plans to export 
its new-model Altima from the United States. 
While imports of motor vehicle parts from Ja-
pan are declining, there has been a conspicuous 
increase in exports to Japan. This can be attributed 
to the aggressive development of the Japanese 
market by South Korean manufacturers of motor 
vehicle parts, and to the expansion of procurement 
in South Korea by Japanese assemblers. 
In 2012, Hyundai Mobis reportedly won supply 
contracts worth a total of $233 million (approxi-
mately ¥18.6 billion), including orders from Mit-
subishi Motors for headlamps worth $200 million 
(approximately ¥16 billion), and from Subaru for 
rear lamps worth $33 million (approximately ¥2.6 
billion). 
As part of cost-cutting efforts, companies in Ja-
pan are also expanding their procurement of parts 
and materials manufactured in South Korea. This 
trend is especially evidence in the Renault-Nissan 
Group, to which Renault Samsung is affiliated. In 
value terms, parts manufactured in South Korea 
make up approximately 20% of Nissan Motor’s 
new NV350 Caravan commercial vehicle, which 
Nissan Shatai Kyushu has started to produce. The 
parts are actually sourced from suppliers of Re-
nault Samsung with plants in the area around Pu-
san. 
Parts manufactured in South Korea are pro-
duced to a consistent quality standard, and in ad-
dition to their low prices, procurement in South 
Korea also results in lower logistics costs. Nissan 
Shatai Kyushu’s plant in Kanda-machi, Fukuoka 
Prefecture is only about 200 kilometers from Pu-
san, which is less than the distance to the Kanto 
and Chubu regions in Japan. Under an agreement 
between the Japanese and South Korean govern-
ments in September 2011, it became possible to 
establish seamless logistics links between Japan 
and South Korea. These means that Japanese trail-
ers can travel on South Korean roads and return 
to Japan by ferry to deliver parts to motor vehicle 
plants in Japan. This approach represents one vi-
sion for the future of Japan-South Korea relations. 
Exports of motor vehicle parts from South Ko-
rea to Japan have thus expanded dramatically, and 
the trade in parts is now basically in balance. In 
addition, South Korea’s overall trade deficit with 
Japan is also tending to shrink (Fig. 17). 
South Korea’s deficit in trade with Japan was a 
key issue during the now suspended negotiations 
over an economic partnership agreement (EPA) 
with Japan. The reduction of that deficit will have 
a positive effect on efforts to resume the negotia-
tions. 
Fig. 17   South Korea’s Trade with Japan
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics System
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(3)  Expectations of Improvement in Relation-
ship 
The governments of Japan and South Korea 
need to renew their awareness of the fact that each 
country is an important economic partner for the 
other so that the economic relationship can be 
taken to a higher level. An EPA between Japan 
and South Korea would result in closer economic 
ties between the two countries, and it is hoped that 
government-level negotiations, which are current-
ly suspended, will be resumed(15).
Clearly it would be easier for Japan to make 
progress toward an EPA with South Korea than 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). This is appar-
ent from the fact that rice has been excluded from 
all FTA’s signed by South Korea so far, and from 
the fact that the deadlines for the removal of tar-
iffs have been set at 10 years for tomatoes, cucum-
bers and pork and other items under the FTA with 
Chile, which took effect in 2004, at 15 years for 
beef under the FTA with the United States, and at 
10 years for pork under the FTA with the EU. For 
these reasons, we can assume that Japan will be 
able to approach EPA negotiations with South Ko-
rea flexibly, taking domestic factors into account. 
South Korea would probably be more willing to 
resume negotiations if its access to Japan’s farm 
and marine product markets could be improved. In 
the past South Korea viewed imports of industrial 
goods from Japan with a strong sense of caution, 
but these concerns have faded in recent times. 
This is because the relative positions of the two 
countries in relation to exports of electrical ap-
pliances has been reversed, while motor vehicles 
exported from the United States have partially re-
placed exports from Japan.
On this basis, the wisest course for Japan would 
be to take the initiative by offering South Korea 
improved access to its farm and marine product 
markets as a way of opening a path to the resump-
tion of government-level negotiations. A closer re-
lationship between Japan and South Korea is also 
essential to efforts to achieve regional integration 
and stability in Asia. 
Conclusions
South Korea’s president elect, Park Geun-hye, 
will take office on February 25, 2013. The new 
Park administration is expected to enforce a pol-
icy of economic democratization in an attempt 
to move away from an excessive dependence on 
chaebol (conglomerates). 
In terms of external economic relationships, 
China has become the largest trading partner for 
both Japan and South Korea, but as discussed ear-
lier in this article, Japan is still an important eco-
nomic partner for South Korea, and vice versa. 
Economic relations between Japan and South Ko-
rea are expected to become closer if an economic 
partnership agreement (EPA) is signed. There are 
many areas in which Japan could contribute to the 
development of small and medium businesses, 
which is a priority for South Korea. 
While China’s emergence has provided many 
economic opportunities for East Asian countries, 
Pacific Rim countries are nervous about China’s 
growing international influence in both military 
and economic terms. In this sense, Japan and 
South Korea, which both view democracy and a 
market economy as fundamental principles, have 
much to gain by working together to build a stable 
regional order. There is plenty of scope for politi-
cal dynamics to strengthen the relationship be-
tween Japan and South Korea. 
For these reasons, 2013 could be a year in 
which the relationship between Japan and South 
Korea will expand to a new level.
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End Notes
1. See Mukoyama, H. [2010] and [2012b] for an analysis 
of this aspect.
2.  According to the Korean Educational Development In-
stitute, the number of students on leaves of absence from 
universities has reached 930,000 (as of April 1, 2012). 
Students are interrupting their university studies mainly 
to take courses in language schools, to prepare for pub-
lic service examinations, or to earn money to pay tuition 
fees. The Chosun Ilbo featured interesting articles on 
the situation of these people between January 8 and 11, 
2013.
3.  In essence, the Commission on Shared Growth revived a 
system under which certain areas of business were legal-
ly reserved for SMEs. For example, the Commission has 
designated product categories that are suitable for SMEs, 
and product areas from which major corporations should 
withdraw.
4.  Another focus of criticism was the fact that the bakery 
business was delegated to third-generation members of 
the founding families, including the granddaughter of 
Samsung Chairman Lee Kun-hee (the son of the found-
er), the daughter of Hyundai Chairman Chung Mong-
Koo (the son of the founder) and the granddaughter of 
Lotte founder and Chairman Shin Kyuk-ho. 
5.  Any moves to tighten domestic regulations could cause 
the chain to accelerate the opening of overseas out-
lets. Both E-Mart and Lotte-Mart have expanded their 
chains in China and plan to open more outlets in South-
east Asia. (For details, see The Korea Times, January 7, 
2013.)
6.  Interestingly, the “economic democratization” concept 
emerged from a conservative party. The present constitu-
tion was adopted after the 1987 Democratization Decla-
ration and Article 119 Clause 2 is also known as the Kim 
Jong-in clause. At the time, Mr. Kim (Saenuri Party) was 
chairman of the economic subcommittee of a special 
constitutional reform committee.
7.  See Ko, Y. [2003] for an analysis of this aspect.
8.  South Korea is concerned that the decline in its produc-
tive-age population and falling real estate prices will 
push it into a prolonged period of stagnation similar to 
that experienced by Japan. The Korea Times carried a 
special feature on the risk of “Japanization” in its Janu-
ary 8, 2013 edition.
9.  According to Kim Sung-won [2011], KBS broadcast a 
program called “Twilight Poverty―The Elderly Who 
Pick up Garbage” in February 2011.   
10.  See Kim Sung-won [2011] and Kim, Hyang-nam [2011] 
for a discussion of the living standards of the aged.
11.  On December 28, 2012, the threshold for the 38% top 
tax rate on financial income (interest and dividends) was 
lowered from 40 million won to 20 million.
12.  See Mukoyama, H. [2012a] for an analysis of recent 
developments in Japan and South Korea’s economic 
relationship and Japan’s stance on investment in South 
Korea.
13.  The number of Japanese visitors to South Korea in Oc-
tober and November declined by over 20% year on year, 
though current reports indicate that there has been a re-
covery trend since the presidential election.
14.  In fact, the won shifted to an upward trend in the fall 
of the same year, in part because of inflows of money 
resulting from progress toward the stabilization of Eu-
rope’s debt problems, and the third round of quantitative 
monetary easing in the United States. See Mukoyama, H. 
[2009] for an analysis of the reasons for the won’s sharp 
fall after the Lehman Shock and the expansion of the 
swap agreement between Japan and South Korea.
15.  These negotiations began in December 2003, and were 
suspended in November of the following year. This may 
have been partly a consequence of the official visit made 
by then Prime Minister Koizumi to Yasukuni Shrine, 
though the main reason was probably the refusal of the 
Japanese government to open up the farm and marine 
produce market.
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